ECON 451: Public Choice
Professor Peter Coughlin


May's Conditions

The background readings are:


1) Jerry S. Kelly, Social Choice Theory: An Introduction

[1] From "We now seek ... " in the first line after the exercises on p. 7 through the

Theorem on p. 12;

[2] p. 14




2) Alan Taylor & Alison Pacelli, Mathematics and Politics, 2nd edition

Section 1.2 (on pages 4-5),





The following items are recommended readings (designed to supplement the background references):

Sherif El-Helaly, The Mathematics of Voting and Apportionment, Springer, 2019.

[1] From the beginning of Section 1.3 (on page 21) through "... y one-to-one)." in the eighth line of the section;

[2] Section 1.5.5 (on pages 65-67)


Allan Feldman & Roberto Serrano, Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd edition, Springer, 2006.

Entry #7 on p.273


Jean Hendriks & Gareth D. Myles, Intermediate Public Economics, 2nd edition, The MIT Press, 2013.

[1] The first sentence in Section 11.4 (on page 350)

[2] In Section 11.4.1 (which is on page 350-351): From "A widely held ... " at the beginning of the 2nd

sentence through "... a binary choice." at the end of the 2nd-to-last sentence in Section 11.4.1


Jonathan K. Hodge & Richard E. Klima, The Mathematics of Voting and Elections, 2nd edition, American Mathematical Society, 2018.

From the beginning of the section "Anonymity, Neutrality, and Monotonicity" (on p. 3) through the Theorem on the bottom of p. 5


These items are available through Course Reserves at ELMS.